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Much has been written on the impact of the insolvency declaration of a party on 
international arbitration. Thus, the purpose of this d ssertation is to assess the 
impact of an international arbitration and the ensui g award on the pending 
insolvency proceedings of a party to such international commercial arbitration. 
 
The main concern is the case of a non-secured credito ’s claim based on a 
contractual right, where parties have entered into a  arbitration agreement, facing 
insolvency of its counterparty before or after commencing an international 
arbitration. Does insolvency have an impact on the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal or the award can be rendered anyway? Should the award be deemed to 
affect the other creditors of the insolvent? Should it be treated as any other foreign 
decision or does it have features that may entitle i  to supersede domestic law, 
even when confronted with a procedure mainly set upon mandatory rules, such as 
insolvency? Is the nature and purpose of the insolvency procedure relevant? How 
should such impact be perceived by the international commercial legal order? 
 
Due to international arbitration nature and derivation, arbitrators may be deemed 
to have a significant power to influence insolvency proceedings, as they may be 
granting an advantage to a creditor towards all the others, notably when the 
arbitral decision entails set-off and netting. However, such advantage must be 
balanced by the insolvency court, under the principle of equality of treatment of 
non-secured creditors in insolvency. 
 
Portuguese perspective seems to be particularly interesting for such confrontation, 
considering the lack of case law regarding this matter, under the current 
Insolvency Code, in force for the last nine years, nd the influence that a decision 
recently held by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on a pending arbitration may 




I.  Insolvency vs. International Arbitration: differenc es in nature and 
goals 
 
Insolvency1 and arbitration tend to clash with each other as they have diverse 
perspectives, aiming to solve different problems and conflicting underlying 
policies2. This requires a careful interaction whenever a particular situation poses 
problems concerning these two points of view, in an international background. 
 
Arbitration is deemed to be the elected technique of alternative dispute resolution 
whenever international commerce is considered. Interna ional trade often opposes 
parties of different jurisdictions, therefore from different legal environments, who 
do not easily submit a potential dispute to a particular judicial system of the 
country of one of the contracting parties or even to a third and neutral country. 
This choice has much to do with the well-known rigid ty of national procedural 
laws and the difficulty to reach a swift and final decision before domestic courts. 
Celerity and cost-reduction are cherished values by those who look for a solution 
in arbitration, trusting that a final judgement is to be held by whom is familiar 
with the subject-matter of the argument and acquainted with the practices and 
customs of international commerce. 
 
Hence, international commercial arbitration  emerges as the most efficient way 
of settling a dispute regarding issues at the free disposal of the parties, between 
international trade players. However, it is now submitted to go beyond a simple 
party autonomy mechanism and to be part of what has been called the 
transnational order, an autonomous body of principles and rules of international 
                                                          
1 The term insolvency shall be used broadly as a synonym of bankruptcy, liquidation, 
administration and reorganization proceedings. 
2 V LAZIC, ‘Arbitration and Insolvency Proceedings: Claims of Ordinary Bankruptcy Creditors’, 





commerce, detached from any particular national legal system or any specific 
State law and much based in customary law and fundamental principles.3  
 
International arbitration, rooted in such transnational order, is denationalized and 
delocalised. The arbitration clause actually places international arbitration in the 
transnational legal order, from which it derives it recognition and power. As a 
consequence, also arbitrators’ authority and the award itself derive from such 
order. Transnational law features like the severability of the arbitration agreement 
and Kompetenz-kompetenz confirm such position.4 According to the doctrine of 
severability or segregation of the arbitration agreement, even though the contract 
may be invalid, the arbitration agreement therein inserted stands alone for its 
validity and effectiveness. In turn, under kompetenz-kompetenz principle the 
arbitral tribunal is to decide on its own jurisdiction, assuming first that it has 
standing to make such assessment, thus entailing the idea that the jurisdiction of 
arbitral tribunal is decided by the arbitrators thems lves.5   
 
International arbitration is therefore structured upon three pillars: (i) the lex arbitri 
– the law that governs the arbitration, which in a rather traditionalist perspective 
tends to be the national law of the seat of arbitration, (ii)  the lex contractus, the 
governing or substantive law, which does not necessarily have to be a particular 
national system of law, but may refer to public inter ational law or to a blend of 
                                                          
3 J DALHUISEN, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative Commercial, Financial and Trade 
Law, Vol. 1, Hart Pub., 2010, p. 42ff; L LIMA PINHEIRO, in Arbitragem Transnacional. A 
Determinação do Estatuto de Arbitragem, Almedina, Coimbra, 2005, pp. 375ff. 
4 DALHUISEN, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative Commercial, Financial and Trade 
Law, pp. 45ff, and id.,‘The Sources of the Modern Transnational Lex Mercatoria’, ‘The Modern 
Lex Mercatoria and its Dynamism’ and ‘The Modern Lex Mercatoria and International 
Arbitration’ available at http://opiniojuris.org/ 
5 N BLACKABY/C PARTASIDES/A REDFERN/M HUNTER, Redfern and Hunter on 




both or to rules known as ‘international trade law’, ‘transnational law’ or ‘the 
modern law merchant’ – the so-called modern lex mercatoria6, and (iii)  the 
system of recognition an enforcement of international arbitral awards, backed up 
by the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, the ‘New York Convention’, which we shall address later on.  
 
On the other hand, insolvency is set upon a completely different scenario. 
Insolvency is in essence territorial, shaped by the sovereignty aspect of the 
relevant State. Its main legal regime is found in loca  regulatory law, guided by its 
vocation to a universal summoning of the insolvent’s creditors and aimed to set 
forth the ranking of creditors and distribution among them. The underlying 
rationale of its legal regime is based on its public interest function – pay to the 
insolvent creditors and either reorganize or eliminate the insolvent entity from the 
market. This public policy quest for market efficiency translates into the main 
engine of the proceedings, ultimately guided by the creditors’ best interests, the 
protection of the debtor or the preservation of employment, depending on the 
prevailing domestic policy purpose.7 
 
Insolvency legal regimes usually provide for a certain limitation of rights of the 
debtor and its creditors in order to pursue its purpose. Exclusive jurisdiction of 
state courts, mandatory provisions (both substantive and procedural) affecting the 
insolvent party’s assets and ruling the status and co uct of the insolvent party, of 
the creditors and of the trustee, a high degree of state control, dispossession 
procedures, mandatory stay of pending proceedings ad centralisation of credits 
are some of the typical characteristics of insolvency laws.8 
                                                          
6 DALHUISEN, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative Commercial, Financial and Trade 
Law; LIMA PINHEIRO, op. cit., pp. 383ff. 
7 LAZIC, op. cit., p. 3 
8 D BAIZEAU, ‘Arbitration and Insolvency: Issues of Applicable Law’, in New Developments in 





Insolvency proceedings are therefore generally ruled by mandatory provisions, 
leaving less room to party autonomy, which nonethelss may be called upon in a 
recovery or reorganization scenario, where in some circumstances creditors are 
allowed to dictate the restructure of the bankrupted company, as well as the terms 
and conditions of payment plans to creditors. 
 
In this vein, values like the equality of unsecured creditors and protection against 
individual enforcement become fundamental insolvency principles, which in some 
jurisdictions may even rise up to public policy order elements, as we shall see 
later on. 
 
II.  Comparative Law overview 
 
a. Universality v. Territoriality  
 
The interplay between insolvency and international arbitration leads to different 
solutions enacted by each national law. 
 
In order to understand how these two fields of law cope with each other, we 
should bear in mind whether and to what extent a given national legal order 
recognizes an insolvency declared in a different jurisdiction. In this regard, one 
                                                                                                                                                               
Insolvency Proceedings and Their Effect on International Commercial Arbitration, LL.M. 
Thesis, University of Ghent, p. 2, available at 
http://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/001/892/212/RUG01- 01892212_2012_0001_AC.pdf; M 
ROBERTSON, Cross-Border Insolvency and International Commercial Arbitration, 
Characterisation and choice of law issues in light of Elektrim S.A. (in bankruptcy) v Vivendi SA, 






could distinguish between universal and territorial in what concerns the approach 
taken by each legal order vis-à-vis a foreign insolvency.  
 
Under the principle of universality, the lex concursus considers itself to have 
extraterritorial effects and demands recognition in any other jurisdiction, thus a 
third country would generally recognize such foreign insolvency. Ideally this 
would mean that in nowadays globalized reality, an insolvency declaration would 
have its effects accepted and recognized throughout the world and distribution 
amongst creditors would be equally made in a single procedure, either through 
liquidation or reorganization.  
 
Given the difficulties to achieve such a uniform method, by virtue of national laws 
obstacles, a notion of modified universalism has achieved considerable support, 
the main idea being to favour a choice of law according to which the applicable 
law is the law of the lex concursus.9 
 
This is the case in the EU, due to the European Insolvency Regulation10, which 
purpose is to deal with diversity of insolvency laws amongst Member States. 
Thus, whenever insolvency is declared in a particular Member State, such 
declaration and its effects are expected to be acknowledged by all other EU 
jurisdictions, particularly in what concerns the asset  of the insolvent.  
 
Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code also seems to foll w this path. It is 
intended to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border 
                                                          
9 J L WESTBROOK, ‘International Arbitration and Multinational Insolvency’,  in 29 Penn State 
International Law Review 635, 2011, p. 643, available  at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/649/5794.html 
10 Council Regulation (EC) N. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, in Official 




insolvency and therefore provides the legal framework by which US Courts are 
available to companies involved in insolvency proceedings outside the US.11 
 
On the other hand, under a territorial approach, insolvency declared abroad and 
its effects will not be automatically acknowledged. They will entirely depend on 
the policy of the country where recognition is sought. Chinese12 and Swiss13 law 
could be pointed out as examples of this approach. 
 
Although different approaches may be taken by natiol statutory laws, 
insolvency is essentially territorial and any relatd extraterritorial effects 
ultimately depend on the recognizing court, rather t an on a universality concept, 
which, in practice, may prove to be not very helpful. Thus, as we shall see, even 
under the European Insolvency Regulation, different interpretations of the many 
important exceptions14 it comprises, intended to cope with regulatory matters 
within its conflict of law rules model, may actually circumvent such universalist 
purpose. 
 
b. Effects of insolvency in the arbitration: key-issues under discussion 
 
It is commonly acknowledged that times of global economic and financial crisis 
usually bring about an increasing number of companies declared to be in an 
insolvency status, either submitted to liquidation or reorganization proceedings. 
                                                          
11 G H GLINE/J GEISENHEIMER, ‘Constraints on Stay Relief Afforded to Chapter 15 Debtors’,  
ABI Committee News, International Committee vol. 7, n. 6, 2010, available at 
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/inter ational/vol7num6/constraints.html 
12 P K WAGNER, ‘When International Insolvency Law meets International Arbitration’, in 
Dispute Resolution International, vol. 3, n. 1, 2009, p. 66, available  at 
http://www.weitnauer.net/uploads/downloads/aufsaetze/Wagner_article.pdf 
13 BAIZEAU, op. cit., p. 104 




Paying attention to that phenomenon, legal writings, often driven by case law, 
show a growing concern and interest for the impact that such insolvency 
declaration may have where pertaining to a party to an international arbitration.  
 
The discussion has focused on some key-issues, such as the application of 
overriding imperative rules by the arbitral tribunal, the relevance of the seat of 
arbitration and of the country where insolvency was declared; the conduct of the 
arbitral proceedings and the guarantee of due process; the effect of the insolvency 
on the arbitration agreement and the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal; the 
capacity or standing of the insolvent to be a party to the arbitration; the contents 
of the arbitral award and the importance of the place of enforcement. Some of 
these topics shall be now briefly discussed. 
 
i. Overriding mandatory rules or lois d’application immediate 
 
At the heart of the debate is the understanding that some principles and rules of a 
given national law (including core insolvency provisions) may be considered 
overriding mandatory or even regulatory rules, someti es qualified in its own 
country as part of its domestic and international public policy – lois de police or 
lois d’application immediate.15 Being so, in their own perspective and although 
other countries may not accept them as such and therefor  deny its application, 
such rules would be provided with an extraterritorial effect, impinging on the 
ruling of the contract irrespective of its governing law. 
 
If such rules are ignored by the arbitral tribunal, when deciding the dispute, 
recognition/enforcement of the ensuing award may be refused if sought in a 
country where such rules are deemed to be of immediate application, with 
                                                          




grounds on the violation of the country’s public policy, although it could still be 
recognized and enforced elsewhere, .g., where the debtor has assets.  
 
Thus, public order issues should be taken into account by the arbitral tribunal 
when judging the cause. In fact, ‘it is generally accepted that the public policy and 
mandatory provisions of the l x causae should be applied by arbitral tribunals’.16 
Arbitrators should keep to the facts and claim presented by the parties, unless 
overriding principles and rules or interventionist norms which are not part of the 
lex contractus need to be brought in and contemplated to decide the dispute. 
These overriding notions of negative public policy, which work as a correction 
factor, may refer to ethics, fraud, corruption, competition law or regulatory law, 
for instance. In this vein, ‘arbitrators may take into account any other mandatory 
law having a close connection with the subject matter of the dispute, particularly 
where a disregard of such law would lead to a result contrary to international 
public policy’.17 Furthermore, placing international arbitration within a 
transnational legal order, as discussed above, may by virtue of the progressive 
concept of a truly transnational legal order entail limits to the result to which the 
applicable law would lead to, when such result contradicts fundamental rules and 
principles of public international law, deriving from several international sources 
and common to many national States and ‘civilized natio s’.18 
 
International arbitrators still tied up to the moorings of the seat of arbitration, 
seem to be quite aware of the particular risk of having the award annulled 
whenever insolvency matters are at stake, especially when the seat is in the 
                                                          
16 BAIZEAU, op. cit., p. 99. 
17 J POUDRET/S BESSON, Comparative Law of International Arbitration, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2007, p. 610. 
18 LIMA PINHEIRO, op. cit., pp. 265ff, 472ff; F TREZZINI, ‘The Challenge of Arbitral Awards 
for Breach of Public Policy according to Art. 190, para. 2 lit. e) of the Swiss Private International 




country where insolvency was primarily ordered. Again, bearing in mind 
international arbitration position in the transnational legal order, it is clear that 
arbitrators do not have nationalities and should not k w boundaries. They should 
have no seat of their own. Yet it is arbitrators’ duty to produce a final and 
enforceable award. It is thus desirable that particular attention is paid to the 
international public policy of the country where insolvency proceedings were 
lodged or to which the subject-matter of the dispute has a close connection, for 
instance where the defendant has assets19– not because it may happen to be the 
country of the seat, but because it is highly probable that such turns out to be the 
first, if not only, place of the enforcement of the award.  
 
International arbitrators should not pay deference to the law of the seat, except for 
the support-role the jurisdiction of the seat may hve to the arbitration or if an 
issue of international public policy of the country of the seat becomes pertinent.20 
Such deference should thus go to a minimum international standard of public 
policy.21 As for the application of national rules, ‘d’application immediate’ or 
insolvency law, it is up to arbitrators to decide insofar should they be relevant or 
even if they qualify as regulatory rules that must be observed to decide the matter.  
 
ii.   Due process and stay of the arbitral proceedings 
 
The guarantee of due process is also an issue thoroughly discussed whenever 
arbitration faces insolvency of one of the parties. One of the most common 
procedural consequences of the declaration of insolvency of a party to a pending 
arbitration proceeding is to have the insolvent substituted in such proceedings by 
                                                          
19 POUDRET/BESSON, op. cit., p. 610. 
20 DALHUISEN, ‘The Modern Lex Mercatoria and International Arbitration’. 




the new representative appointed within the insolvency – the Liquidator, Trustee, 
Official Receiver or Insolvency Administrator.  
 
On the other hand, should the arbitration commence aft r the declaration of 
insolvency it seems clear that the Notice or Request for Arbitration must be 
addressed to the appointed Administrator,22 as the insolvent representative.23 
 
National legislation frequently provides that the Administrator has the power to 
decide whether he or she will participate in the arbitration proceedings. Yet 
whether the Administrator actually participates or n t has no influence on the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. In some circumstances, even if the 
Administrator refuses such participation, the counterparty may still be able to 
enforce the arbitration award against the insolvent, at least in third countries. 
Consequently, a potential claimant could initiate arbitral proceedings against a 
respondent in administration or a respondent may file a counter-claim against the 
insolvent claimant, even without the Administrator’s consent.  Such arbitration 
would constitute default proceedings – where one of the parties fails to participate 
– and would be more vulnerable to sanction based on the violation of due process, 
which usually qualifies as an infringement of interational public policy.24  
 
Together with such legal provision, many insolvency statutes establish a stay of 
ordinary pending proceedings, in order to assure that the Administrator is 
provided with an opportunity to participate, becomes acquainted with the terms of 
the process and eventually files or reviews its defence. It has been accepted that 
such effect should also apply to arbitration. Failure to fulfil these requirements 
may become very important to demonstrate that both parties did not had equal 
                                                          
22 The term ‘Administrator’ shall be used hereinafter as a synonym of the referred expressions. 






opportunities to be heard by the arbitral tribunal and that in general due process 
was not followed, which may sustain an annulment claim of the award before the 
courts of the seat of the arbitration or ultimately qualify as a ground for the refusal 
of the recognition of the award, when sought before th  enforcement courts, 
pursuant to article V(b) of the New York Convention. 
 
Despite the different solutions adopted throughout national legal orders, the stay 
of the arbitral proceedings seems to collect the majority of the answers to the 
problem emerging from a declaration of insolvency when arbitration has already 
been launched25, even when there are no specific legal provisions referring to 
arbitration.26 Generally, actions aimed for the collection of debts are prevented 
from continuation or commencement as of the date of the insolvency liquidation 
opening. Any claim of an unsecured creditor for payment against the estate, 
including enforcement claims, may only be pursued by filing in insolvency.27 
 
In England and Wales, rules governing the stay of court proceedings are deemed 
to be applicable to arbitration.28 The principle of the preclusion of individual 
action by creditors is inserted in the 1986 English Insolvency Act with respect to 
corporate liquidation or winding-up by the courts, as well as in the case of 
administration proceedings.29 
 
                                                          
25 BAIZEAU, op. cit., p.101 
26V LAZIC, ‘Cross-border Insolvency and Arbitration. Which consequences of Insolvency 
proceedings should be given effect in Arbitration?’, in  Liber Amicorum Eric Bergsten, 
International Arbitration and International Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and 
Evolution, Kröll/Mistelis/Perales/Viscasillas /Rogers Eds., Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 
352 
27 ibid., p. 340 
28 POUDRET/BESSON, op. cit., p. 505 




In Germany, the arbitral tribunal must allow the Administrator, as the successor of 
the insolvent, sufficient time to prepare its defenc , which may in practice lead to 
a stay of the proceedings.30 The opening of proceedings establishes a prohibition 
of individual compulsory enforcement, meaning that the insolvency creditors 
cannot, for the duration of the proceedings, enforce either upon the insolvency 
assets or upon the debtor’s available assets. The insolvency creditors shall only be 
permitted to enforce their claims under the provision  governing the insolvency 
proceedings.31 
 
In Switzerland, authors are divided regarding a mandatory stay of the arbitral 
proceedings upon a party’s insolvency. The relevant provision of Swiss law is 
article 207 of the Debt Collection and Insolvency Act, under which civil court 
proceedings to which the debtor is a party are stayed (ex lege) when one party is 
declared insolvent. The question is to consider if sa d provision should be applied 
to international arbitral proceedings as well. The majority of commentators, 
though, is against a mandatory stay of the arbitral p oceedings and considers that 
such provision is not part of public policy. Furthermore it is submitted that the 
rule’s purpose is fulfilled if the insolvency administrator is provided with the 
opportunity to be acquainted with the case and to assess the overall situation in 
order to be able to make the necessary decisions. 32 
 
                                                          
30 POUDRET/BESSON, op. cit., p. 505 
31Section 87 Insolvenzordnung, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/inso/index.html. 
32 POUDRET/BESSON, op. cit., p. 505; G NATER-BASS/O MOSIMANN, ‘Effects of Foreign 





French Code of Civil Procedure contains an express provision on the interruption 
of arbitral domestic proceedings33, when reorganisation or bankruptcy liquidation 
has been opened.34 Also, under French law all individual claims enforced against 
real estate and movable assets of the debtor, as well as all legal actions aiming for 
payment against the debtor are suspended.35 This provision is deemed to be a part 
of national and international public policy (ordre public).36 
 
In the Netherlands, after the declaration of insolvency, any claim against the 
debtor for payment out of the estate can only be asserted in the verification 
procedure. Pending domestic arbitral proceedings shall be suspended with the 
opening of the insolvency. Although not univocally, since there are dissident 
opinions in legal writings and case law, this provision has been deemed not to 
exclude or prevent the continuation of pending arbitrations under Dutch law, i.e., 
such proceedings may be resumed if the claim is disputed in the verification 
procedure, either by the trustee or by another creditor, as it occurs with court 
proceedings.37 
 
Similar provisions can be found in other legal European orders as in Austria, 
Belgium and Italy.38 
 
                                                          
33Art. 1471 which remits to arts. 369 to 362 of Code de Procédure Civile, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=CF341466BA543976AF3255D6E45FE
B34.tpdjo13v_2?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070716&dateTexte=20130604 
34 LAZIC, ‘Cross-border Insolvency and Arbitration’, p. 352. 
35As per art. L622-21 § 2Code de Commerce, cf. LAZIC ‘Cross-border Insolvency and 
Arbitration’, p.350 ft. 30.  
36 LAZIC, ibid.; NATER-BASS/MOSIMANN, op. cit, p. 177. 
37 Pursuant to arts. 26 and 29 of Dutch Insolvency Act (Faillissementswet); cf. LAZIC, ibid., p. 
351 ft. 35, and ‘Arbitration and Insolvency Proceedings’, p. 15, ft. 84.  




As for the United States, the Bankruptcy Code provides for a broad stay of all 
lawsuits and arbitrations, at least temporarily, unless the court allows them to 
proceed.39 Unlike the relevant provisions of the insolvency statutes in France and 
in the Netherlands, the US automatic stay can, in theory, cease by the decision of 
the court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy or upon a certain period of time.40 All 
claims against the insolvent are to be filed before the insolvency court. The filing 
of a petition under the Code, ‘operates as a stay, applicable to all entities’ for 
actions taken against the insolvent, including commencing or continuing a legal or 
administrative proceeding, attempts to enforce judgments against a debtor or its 
property or attempts to collect or recover a claim gainst the debtor. After filing 
such a petition for relief, almost all claims against the insolvent are prevented 
from being executed and prosecuted.41 The stay comes into effect immediately 
upon filing a petition, without further application for relief.42 The automatic stay 
is one of the fundamental protections given to a debtor and the estate by the 
bankruptcy laws. It operates as protection for creditors as well, providing for 
their equal treatment in an orderly manner.43 
 
iii.   Locus standi or legal capacity? 
 
The procedural matter concerning the representation of the insolvent, usually 
referred as locus standi, and its ability to participate in arbitration has been many 
times misunderstood and framed as a question of (lack of) capacity of the 
insolvent to be a party to the arbitration. 
 
                                                          
39 Section §362(a); WESTBROOK, op. cit., p. 639, ft. 14 
40 Section §362(e); LAZIC, ‘Arbitration and Insolvency Proceedings’, p. 15. 
41 The only exceptions are those actions expressly exempted under Section §362(b). 
42 GLINE/GEISENHEIMER, op. cit. 




In fact, one of the most important consequences of entering into insolvency 
proceedings is that the insolvent loses its ability to freely dispose of its estate. The 
extent of such limitation of the right to manage and dispose of its assets may vary 
according to the applicable insolvency law, but usually includes the possibility to 
proceed with or defend legal actions brought against it. However, as previously 
mentioned, such limitations provided by national law have territorial effect only. 
The powers of the insolvent over assets of its estat  located in other countries will 
depend on the law of such third jurisdictions. Until insolvency is recognized and 
its effects accepted, the insolvent retains full capacity regarding such assets. 
 
Disposal powers are usually transferred to the Administrator, who is the appointed 
entity to govern the estate and represent the insolvent thereon. For instance, 
Chinese insolvency law expressly provides that the Administrator is the one who 
should participate in legal actions, arbitrations or any other legal procedures on 
behalf of the insolvent.44 Under US insolvency law, upon insolvency order, the
trustee becomes the representative of the estate and has capacity to sue and be 
sued.45  
 
Some disposal powers may however be subject to a prior approval from the 
creditors’ assembly or committee or from the Court. Under Portuguese insolvency 
law, for example, the insolvency administrator acts as the legal representative of 
the insolvent, but cannot sell specific assets of the estate without a previous 
approval from the creditors committee.46 Also, under English insolvency law, 
subject to prior permission of the creditors’ committee or the court, the trustee 
may carry on any business of the bankrupt so far as may be necessary for winding 
it up, bring, institute or defend any legal action or legal proceedings relating to the 
                                                          
44 YANG, op. cit. 
45 Section 323 US Code. 




property comprised in the bankrupt’s estate. In a company winding-up 
proceeding, the liquidator is entitled to bring or defend any legal action on behalf 
of or against the estate, without sanction of the court or the liquidation committee 
in voluntary winding-up, whereas in compulsory winding-up by the court, with 
such sanction.47  
 
The discussion around the l gal capacity of the insolvent to be a party to the 
arbitration was thoroughly debated in light of the Vivendi vs. Elektrim cases, 
which became paramount examples of the importance of the choice of applicable 
law in international arbitration. 
 
The Vivendi cases48 emerged from a dispute between Vivendi Universal S.A. and 
Vivendi Telecom S.A., both French companies (‘Vivendi’), and Elektrim, a Polish 
company, regarding the purchase of shares of a Polish mobile telephone company 
(Polska Telephoia Cyfrowa) by the former. The agreement under discussion – 
Third Investment Agreement – was entered into in 2001 and contained an 
arbitration clause providing for arbitration in London, according to the Arbitration 
Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA).  
 
By filing a claim for breach of the agreement in an mount of € 1.9 billion, 
Vivendi commenced arbitration in London, in 2003. 
 
                                                          
47 Section 314(1)(a) and Part I Sched.5 (1 and 2),  Section 314(1)(b) and Part II Sched. 5(9A) and 
Sections 165 and 167 and Parts I and II of Sched. 4 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
48 See, among others, BAIZEAU, op. cit., p.113, and ‘Compétence de l´Arbrite et Faillite à la 
Lumiére des Arrêts Anglais et Suisse dans l’Affaire Vivendi c/ Elektrim’, Les Cahiers de 
l’Arbitrage 2009/3, available at http://www.chaffetzlindsey.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/12/00013089.PDF; NATER-BASS/ MOSIMANN, op. cit.; LAZIC, 





In March 2006, Vivendi and Elektrim, among others, entered into a settlement 
agreement, which included an arbitral agreement referring any disputes to a 
tribunal to be constituted under the rules of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (‘ICC’), with seat in Geneva, Switzerland.  
 
Vivendi alleged a breach of the settlement agreement and commenced the Swiss 
arbitration proceedings in April 2006. Elektrim filed its defence claiming that it 
had been declared insolvent by the Warsaw District Court in August 2007 and 
that, as a consequence, pursuant to article 142 of the Polish insolvency law, it had 
lost its legal capacity to be a party to the arbitration, either by itself or through the 
appointed Administrator, Mr. Josef Syska.  
 
According to the translation agreed upon between th parties, article 142 of the 
Polish insolvency law states that ‘any arbitration clause concluded by the 
bankrupt shall lose its legal effect as at the date insolvency is declared and any 
pending arbitration proceedings shall be discontinued.’ 
 
1. The Swiss Vivendi case 
 
The arbitral tribunal considered that Polish law governed the effect of the 
insolvency in Elektrim’s capacity to be a party in the arbitration and concluded 
that, pursuant to the referred legal provision, it had no jurisdiction to decide the 
matter. Vivendi sought for the annulment of the arbitral tribunal’s interim award 
on jurisdiction before the Swiss courts, but in March 2009 the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court confirmed the arbitral tribunal’s decision declining jurisdiction 
with respect to Elektrim49. 
 
                                                          





In summary, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court held that the Swiss Federal Act on 
Private International Law50 (SPILA) contains a specific provision on the capacity 
to be a party to an arbitration (capacité d’être partie a un arbitrage), but only 
applicable to State entities, which provides that tey may not invoke its own law 
to contest the arbitrability of a dispute or their capacity to be subject to an 
arbitration.51 Thus, when considering a private entity, such capaity depends on 
the law applicable according to the relevant conflict of law rules, which in what 
regards a company refers to the law of the State under which it is organized.52 
Since Elektrim was a Polish company, its capacity to be a party to the arbitration 
should be governed by Polish law. According to the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court, the application of Polish law led to the application of article 142 of Polish 
insolvency law which was deemed to deprive a Polish insolvent party of its 
capacity to continue with a pending arbitration. Consequently, according to the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Elektrim had lost its capacity to be a party to 
arbitral proceedings. 
 
2. Revisiting Vivendi’s reasoning 
  
In a recent case, however, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court had the chance to 
revisit this theme and shed light on the rather criticized reasoning held in 
Vivendi.53   
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In August 2010, a Chinese company started arbitration proceedings in Geneva, 
under ICC rules, against a Portuguese company that had been declared insolvent a 
year before. The Portuguese Administrator argued that the arbitral tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction to settle the dispute, since the respondent had been declared insolvent 
in August 2009.  
 
In its defence, the Portuguese insolvent company invoked a particular provision, 
article 8754 of the Portuguese Insolvency and Recuperation of Companies Code 
(‘PIC’), which allegedly would have caused the suspension of the efficacy of the 
arbitration agreement to which the insolvent was a party. In an interim award 
rendered in November 2011, the arbitral tribunal held that it had jurisdiction to 
decide the dispute at hand. 
 
The respondent challenged the award before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 
which, in a decision rendered in October 201255, upheld the arbitral tribunal’s 
finding that the referred legal provision did not apply to the subject of the dispute. 
 
In fact, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court considered that a Portuguese insolvency 
estate remains a holder of rights and obligations, i.e., enjoys legal personality, 
until its full liquidation. Consequently, it also has legal capacity to participate in 
an arbitration under Chapter 12 of SPILA56. Even if some kind of “lack of 
capacity to intervene in arbitrations” could be deriv d from article 87(1) PIC for 
future (Portuguese) arbitrations, this would be irrlevant to the capacity to be a 
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party according to the Swiss lex arbitri, provided that the insolvent has legal 
personality, which was undisputed in the case (§3.4.2). Therefore, according to 
the Swiss lex arbitri, article 87(1) PIC regulates one aspect of the substantive 
validity of the arbitration agreement that must be assessed in light of article 
178(2) SPILA, which states that an arbitration agreem nt is valid if it complies 
with the law chosen by the parties, the law governing the dispute or with Swiss 
law. In any case, under Swiss law, insolvency does not affect the validity of an 
arbitration agreement, which is why article 87(1) PIC does not deprive the 
arbitration clause of its efficacy (§3.6). 
 
Responding to the appellant’s argument, according to which the Vivendi case 
reasoning should be mirrored in the case under discussion, the Court enlightened 
that the Vivendi judgment should be assessed in the specific context of Polish law 
and of the doctrine developed thereunder, which wasexpressed in the legal 
opinions of the Polish law professors. It could neith r be generalized, nor the 
conclusions withdrawn therein, as to Polish law, extended to other legal orders. In 
particular, it cannot be inferred from the fact that article 142 of the Polish 
insolvency law contains no explicit reference to the legal capacity or to the 
capacity to be a party, that Portuguese article 87 PIC should be interpreted in the 
same way, despite any resemblances in the wording of both provisions, 
particularly when such an interpretation does not result from Portuguese case law 
or legal writings, as the arbitral tribunal considered proved (§3.5.3). 
 
The underlying reasoning of the Swiss chapter in Vivendi has become now much 
clearer after the quoted 2012 decision. The arbitral tribunal and the Swiss court’s 
judgements were determined by the framing that the parties gave to the issue – 
thus, the importance of the parties’ allegation. In fact, pleading that the respondent 
lacked legal capacity to participate in the arbitration triggered the path for 
arbitrators and judges, who felt compelled to apply the law of the place of 




pure matter of insolvency law with a corporate law issue. When recently 
reviewing its own judgement, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court led us to conclude 
that the only reason why the decision in Vivendi resulted in the confirmation that 
Elektrim had lost its capacity to be a party in the arbitration was that, according to 
Polish scholars, this was deemed to be the correct interpretation to be drawn out of 
article 142 of the Polish insolvency law, despite th fact that its wording does not 
specifically refer to legal capacity. Moreover, by deciding as it did, the Court 
actually acknowledged the Polish insolvency law provisi n with an 
extraterritorial effect that it did not had, considering that Elektrim’s insolvency 
had not been recognised in Switzerland and therefore the effects of such 
insolvency could only be argued in Poland and in thrd countries that would have 
accepted it under their own law. 
 
On the other hand, confronted with a similar Portuguese legal provision, the same 
Court was convinced that the legal capacity of the insolvent company was left 
untouched and that no legal Portuguese provision, case law or doctrine pointed to 
a different conclusion. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court confirmed that 
subjective arbitrability in an international arbitration proceeding with a seat in 
Switzerland should be decided pursuant to the conflict rules of Swiss law, the l x 
arbitri . Under such provisions, corporations are governed by the law of the State 
in which they are incorporated. As a result, the Court ruled that where a foreign 
entity has legal personality under its constitutive law, it has the capacity to act in 
an international arbitral proceedings with seat in Switzerland. Furthermore, the 
Court confirmed that even if article 87 PIC would prevent a Portuguese 
insolvency estate to act as a party in a Portuguese arbitral proceedings, this would 
be without influence on an international arbitral proceedings in Switzerland. 
According to the Court, in Switzerland, it is only important that national law 
affords legal personality to the insolvent and thus that it may have rights and 
liabilities. The Court found that there are several provisions in Portuguese law 




rights and liabilities (thus, legal personality) until its liquidation is completed, 
therefore also being legally capable of participating in arbitration, under chapter 
12 SPILA. In particular the Court noted that it result  from article 87(2) PIC, 
pursuant to which arbitral proceedings which are pending at the moment of the 
declaration of insolvency shall proceed, that an insolvency estate’s capacity to act 
is itself not affected by Portuguese law in an already pending arbitral proceedings 
(§3.4.2). As a result, the Court correctly concluded that the declaration of 
insolvency did not prevent the insolvent from participating in an arbitration in 
Switzerland.  
 
3. The English Vivendi case 
 
In the English Vivendi case, Elektrim did not raise the issue of its alleged lack of 
capacity and rather challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, again based 
on article 142 of the Polish insolvency law. Because of that, the choice of the 
applicable law was different and the ultimate result was the opposite.57 
 
In March 2008, the English arbitral tribunal consider ng that both the arbitration 
and the insolvency proceedings were pending in two different EU Member States 
applied the European Insolvency Regulation (‘Regulation’), which deals with 
proceedings being conducted in one EU Member State, while insolvency 
proceedings involving one of the parties to the arbitration agreement has been 
opened in another Member State. The arbitral tribunal further considered that, 
pursuant to the Regulation, English law was to be applied and overruled 
Elektrim’s insolvency administrator application, considering that it had 
jurisdiction to settle the dispute. The High Court confirmed the award’s 
                                                          




conclusions in October 2008, which were upheld by the Court of Appeal, in July 
200958. 
 
In determining the law that should govern the consequences of the insolvency 
declared in one Member State, insofar as they affect the arbitration pending in 
another Member State, the Court of Appeal particularly contemplated the 
provisions contained in articles 4 and 15 of the Regulation. In what matters for the 
case at hand, the referred provisions provide that the law applicable to insolvency 
proceedings and their effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory 
of which such proceedings are opened, notably on current contracts to which the 
debtor is party and on proceedings brought by individual creditors, with te 
exception of lawsuits pending.59 
 
The effects of insolvency proceedings on lawsuits pending are addressed in article 
15: 
 
‘The effects of insolvency proceedings on a lawsuit pending concerning an asset 
or right of which the debtor has been divested shall be governed solely by the 
law of the Member State in which that lawsuit is pending.’ 
 
The Court of Appeal interpreted this rules’ intersection in light of the Regulation’s 
purpose and concluded that ‘if litigation or arbitration has begun before 
insolvency occurs the natural expectation of businesses would be that it should be 
that law [of that Member State where the legal action has begun or the reference 
to arbitration is taking place] that should determine whether the proceedings 
should continue or come to a shuddering halt.’ 
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As a result, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the expression lawsuit pending in 
article 15 comprises pending arbitral proceedings. Al o, although an arbitration 
agreement may be considered a current contract, as far as it relates to future, non-
pending arbitral proceedings, and to that extent governed by the lex concursus, in 
relation to existing, pending arbitral proceedings, the particular rule of pending 
lawsuits applies and, pursuant to article 4(2)(f) and rticle 15, the law of the State 
where such proceedings are pending shall govern.60  
 
Consequently, in the case under analysis, English and not Polish law applied. 
Pursuant to English law the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the case and 
the insolvency did not affect the course of arbitration. In conclusion, the Court of 
Appeal considered that the arbitrators came to the correct conclusion and the High 
Court was correct to decline to set aside their award. 
 
This case has revealed the importance of the Regulation whenever arbitration 
comes across insolvency within the EU territory. When Vivendi decided to 
enforce the final arbitral decision against Elektrim’s estate in Poland, the Polish 
Court refused to enforce the damages awarded at first. However, the decision was 
overturned by the Warsaw Court of Appeal, granting recognition and enforcement 
to the LCIA award. In sum, the Court considered that e scope of article 15 of the 
Regulation was broad enough to cover arbitration proceedings and that no 
violation of public policy would be committed with t e recognition of an award 
rendered against a Polish insolvent company in a country where the law allows for 
continuation of arbitration.61 
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In conclusion, from an international arbitration perspective, insolvency does not 
trigger a problem of incapacity of the party, especially when the insolvency order 
was not recognized at the country of the seat. It rather poses a challenge to 
observe due process guarantee, as in most of the cas s it may entail the 
substitution of the insolvent by its Administrator, who will ultimately decide to 
participate or not, without affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal or the 
continuation of the proceedings. 
 
iv.  Validity of the arbitration agreement 
 
Another topic of discussion is the effect that the declaration of insolvency may 
have on the validity of the arbitration agreement. 
 
As previously mentioned, the principle of the segregation or severability of the 
arbitration clause entails the idea that even thoug the agreement is deemed to be 
invalid, such clause is autonomous, stands alone and survives. This conception 
also triggers the discussion on the governing law of the arbitral agreement. In fact, 
if for instance, according to the choice of the parties, the governing law of the 
contract is English law and the arbitration clause is separated from the rest of the 
contract one may ask what the governing law of the arbitration agreement should 
be: English law also or another one, like the law of the seat, for example? 
 
In this regard, it is generally understood that, although severable, the arbitration 
clause is still part of the agreement and as a consequence, the governing law of the 
arbitration agreement should be the same, especially when chosen by the parties, 
as the parties’ autonomy should prevail. In fact, predictability can in our view be 
best achieved if the validity of the arbitration agreement is to be determined 




the lex arbitri.62 However, in accordance with the concept previously discussed 
that places the arbitration agreement in transnational order, such agreement 
should be governed by private transnational law fundamental principles, 
mandatory customs and practices and treaty law and only complementarily by 
party autonomy’s choice of law. 
 
Thus, when confronted with insolvency effects, the arbitration agreement could be 
deemed unharmed insofar as it remains valid in light of its own governing law (be 
it transnational law, lex mercatoria or under ‘common principles’ of national 
systems of law), validity which is to be assessed freely by arbitrators 
themselves.63 
 
The application of the lex concursus to the arbitration agreement pursuant to the 
declaration of insolvency of one of the parties’ may reveal to be disastrous to 
international arbitration – as we already had the can e to see in the Swiss Vivendi 
case.64 Such a solution is capable of completely frustrating he expectations of the 
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parties, who have chosen to settle any dispute arising from the agreement away 
from either national courts and have now to face the effects of an unknown rather 
rigid legal regime on such agreement. Furthermore, it may inclusively motivate a 
party willing to escape from a current or imminent arbitration to file for 
insolvency as a maneuver to plea the invalidity of the arbitration agreement or 
even the loss of capacity to participate in arbitration and consequently the lack of 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to hear the case. And one has to bear in mind 
that, since the arbitration agreement may be deemed a current contract regarding 
to non-pending arbitrations, for the purpose of article 4(2)(e) of the Regulation, 
this is actually the solution put in place in the EU whenever insolvency is declared 
in one of its Member States and should have its effects recognized by any 
(annulment or enforcement) court in other Member State.  
 
Thus, in light of a favor arbitratis approach, the law governing the insolvency 
proceedings should only be applicable to very limited procedural issues, such as 
the representation of the insolvent by the insolvency administrator and the extent 
of its powers, for instance to settle the dispute, and only to the extent that such 
insolvency is recognized. No impact however should be drawn out of such 
insolvency order by arbitrators regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement 
and therefore the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.65 
 
III.   Recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award 
 
The legal framework of recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award in a 
given country is one of the most important indicators f its involvement in 
international commerce. 
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There are basically three systems of recognition and enforcement of such awards 
based on its legal source. The most important is the one set forth in the 
abovementioned New York Convention, which, as of June 2013, has 149 parties 
and 24 signatories.66 Secondly, we find the regime established in other bilateral or 
multilateral international treaties. In the countries that did not sign said 
Convention and are not bound by any other public international law instrument, 
such cases are ruled by their own law regarding recognition and enforcement of 
foreign decisions.67 
 
Apart from this general legal framework, we may still point out the regime 
provided by the 1965 Washington Convention on the settlement of investment 
disputes between States and nationals of other States, which provides for a 
mandatory recognition of the awards rendered under ICSID68 arbitration and 
compels to the enforcement of the pecuniary obligations imposed therein as if it 
were a final judgment of a court in that State.69 
 
Under the New York Convention, any arbitral award, arising out of differences 
between natural or legal persons, rendered in a State different than the one where 
recognition and enforcement are sought shall be recognized and enforced by the 
courts and public authorities of a signatory State. 
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Exceptions to this broad rule may however apply if the enforcement State adopted 
the so called reciprocity reservation, according to which recognition and 
enforcement may be refused to awards not rendered in the territory of other 
contracting State, or if the enforcement State has restricted the substantive scope 
of the convention by declaring it to be only applicable to awards referring to 
“commercial relationships”, qualified as such by its own domestic law – the 
commercial reservation.70 Moreover, such recognition and enforcement obligation 
shall also apply regarding any written agreement enter d into between the parties 
according to which the dispute is to be settled by resort to arbitration.71 
 
Hence, the courts of any contracting State, if confronted with a dispute which the 
parties have previously and validly referred to arbitration or with an international 
arbitral award, must redirect the parties to the arbitration upon request of one of 
them or recognize and enforce the award, unless some of the exceptions provided 
in article V of the New York Convention apply.  
 
Article V  expressly states that the court may refuse to recognize and enforce the 
award if any of the exceptions set forth therein apply. Thus, it should be noted that 
even if one of the following circumstances occurs, it is not mandatory for the 
Court to refuse recognition and enforcement. Such decision depends only on the 
Court’s discretion. Furthermore, the burden of proof that the exception applies is 
on the party against whom the recognition and enforcement of the award is 
sought. However, no revision on the merits shall be allowed. Therefore, any claim 
based on errors of judgement, whether of fact or law, cannot qualify as grounds 
for such refusal. Also, it is worth noting that this l st of exceptions is absolutely 
exhaustive, meaning that it does not allow any extensiv  interpretation or 
                                                          
70 Art. I. 




analogical reasoning, which could qualify as an abusive review on the merits by a 
national court.72 
 
In view of the discussion held so far, the exceptions more commonly argued in 
cases where one of the parties has been declared insolve t shall now be briefly 
reviewed. 
 
First of all, under the provision set forth in article V(1)(a), the court may refuse 
recognition and enforcement of the award if it finds that the parties to the 
arbitration agreement were under some incapacity in light of their own law. What 
matters here is whether a certain party had the requisite capacity at the time of 
execution of the arbitration agreement, on the moment of the conclusion of the 
agreement, and not at the time of the commencement of the arbitration, on the 
date of the award or as of the respective enforcement. It refers to the capacity o 
enter such an agreement. Such understanding results from the wording of the 
provision under analysis which uses the past tense: “parties to the agreement [...] 
were [...] under some incapacity”.73  
 
Thus, even if one would consider that the insolvency of one of the parties to the 
arbitration would trigger its incapacity – discussed previously – such incapacity 
would be irrelevant for the scope of this exception, si ce it would have occurred 
after the execution of the arbitration agreement. 
 
The court may also refuse recognition and enforcement if it considers that the 
arbitration agreement is not valid. Such assessment us  be made in light of the 
relevant governing law: under the law to which the parties have subjected i (the 
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law governing the arbitration agreement) or, failing any indication thereon, under 
the law of the country where the award was made (th  law of the seat). As 
discussed above, insolvency declaration does not by itself generally encumber the 
arbitration agreement’s validity, which remains effective insofar its governing law 
determines so. 
 
Violation of due process may also qualify as a ground for refusal of recognition 
and enforcement of the award, pursuant to article V(1)(b). As previously 
discussed, this guarantee assures that both parties participated in a properly 
conducted arbitral proceeding, in which equality of arms and opportunities were 
granted to each one to plead its case before the tribunal and have a fair hearing. 
Thus, lack of proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator(s) or of the 
arbitration proceedings may fulfil such ground for refusal. Also, any form of 
constraints abusively imposed on a party deemed to have concurred to endanger 
the presentation of its case may also qualify. This notably covers the right to 
submit evidence, to make legal or factual submissions to the tribunal and 
comment on evidence and submissions in the case file before any decision is 
granted. 
 
Naturally, the part invoking such violation will have to demonstrate how such 
violation has determined the decision held by the arbitr l tribunal; that such abuse 
has proved to be detrimental in the final award for the party resisting recognition 
and enforcement. This means that a material infringement of due process 
guarantee (not simply skipping a formality) has to be verified so that refusal 
should be granted. 74 
 
Furthermore, the party willing to use such argument must also be able to produce 
evidence that it had already raised such issue during the arbitral proceedings 
                                                          




although without success. In fact, the silence of the party before a particular 
violation of due process, when it had the chance to raise such objection, may be 
interpreted as a waiver on its right and should be considered abusive when used as 
an (unheard of) argument to sustain the envisaged refusal.75 
 
Once again, issues concerning the governing law should be considered when 
assessing the alleged violation of due process. In fact, due process requirements 
are not the same in every jurisdiction and can be quite different whether applying 
the law of the seat of arbitration or the law of the enforcement court, for instance. 
However, courts practice has chosen a balanced solution. In applying article 
V(1)(b) national judges tend to consider that the law of the forum is the one 
applicable, but it should be mitigated by the interational character of the 
arbitration. Therefore, courts have found that compliance with ‘minimal standards 
of fairness’ should work as a minimum pattern for due process, irrespectively of 
what the purely national requirements of domestic law would impose.76 
 
Another argument related to excess of competence or jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal is stated in article V(1)(c), where jurisdiction concerns to matters the 
arbitral tribunal has authority to consider and competence is meant to refer to the 
contents of the decision vis-à-vis the terms of the submission to arbitration. It 
generally refers to situations where, although valid, the decision held in the award 
falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement or the issues submitted by the 
parties to arbitration. The arbitration agreement is not only the source of the 
tribunal jurisdiction but also the limit to the tribunal’s authority.77 But arbitrators 
are generally not allowed to decide ultra petita, i.e., beyond the relief sought by 
the parties, unless mandatory rules of the governing law on the merits apply. 
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Again failure to raise objection to the arbitral decision based on lack of 
jurisdiction or competence may trigger the preclusion of the right to invoke it later 
on before the enforcement court.78 
 
Upon insolvency of one of the parties, the recognitio /enforcement of the award 
may be objected with this ground, if it is considered that the tribunal has rendered 
a decision on issues that are beyond its authority. The question may rise for 
instance when recognition is sought in the country of insolvency79 and the award 
impacts on assets of the estate located in that terri ory. Local courts may deem 
arbitrators to have trespassed their powers, althoug  a different perspective may 
be adopted in third countries.80 
 
Another ground to oppose to recognition and enforcement of a foreign award is 
the improper composition of the arbitral tribunal or flawed arbitral proceedings to 
which article V(1)(d) refers to. Both the composition of the tribunal and the 
conduct of the arbitral proceedings must be in accordance with the parties’ 
agreement, which may specifically refer such procedural issues to a body of law 
or to an arbitral regulation. If no express indication is made, the law applicable to 
the arbitration agreement should apply. As previously mentioned, if the parties 
remained silent in regard of such choice of law, the law governing the contract 
(lex contractus) should apply. And only in case where parties’ autonomy has 
given no indication at all, the law of the seat of the arbitration (the law of the 
country where the arbitration took place) should be called upon to rule such 
matters. 
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In light of article V(1)(e), recognition and enforcement may also be barred when 
the award (i) has not yet become binding on the parties, (ii)  has been set aside or 
(iii)  suspended by a competent authority of the country i  which, or under the law 
of which, that award was made. 
 
The concept of binding award81 is crucial but no clue is given on what is the 
governing law under which it should be qualified as such. Most courts take the 
approach of asserting whether the arbitral award meets all the requirements to be 
binding in light of the applicable arbitration law – which could either point to the 
law of the country of the seat or to the rules of the arbitral institution that rendered 
the award. The award should not be considered binding if it fails to comply with 
some formal requirements established in lex arbitri, unless they amount to a 
double exequatur, or if the party opposing to recognition and enforcement is able 
to prove that a legal remedy with suspensive effect is pending.82 
    
One of the main goals of the drafters of this provision was to overcome the 
requirement of double exequatur, as it was established in the Geneva Convention 
of 1927, according to which the award had to collect two exequaturs, both in the 
country of the seat of arbitration (assuring its f nality) and in the enforcement 
country. Thus, according to article V(1)(e) a contrario, it suffices to achieve only 
the exequatur at the place of the enforcement.83 
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The New York Convention favours here the d localisation theory,84 which 
detaches an international commercial arbitration award from control under the law 
of the place in which it is held and submits it only to the place of enforcement.85 
 
The French Cour de Cassation has expressly adopted this position in 2007, by 
enforcing an arbitral award that had been set aside by the English High Court, 
stating that an international arbitral award, which does not belong to any state 
legal system, is an international decision of justice and its validity must be 
examined according to the applicable rules of the country where its recognition 
and enforcement are sought.86 For French jurisprudence this is actually the ruleto 
be followed. French international arbitration law excludes the setting aside of the 
award as a ground to refuse the enforcement, as the award is not an expression of 
a particular judicial system, but it is rather independent of the legal order of the 
country of its origin.87  
 
Hence, the courts of the seat may still annul the award on the basis of local 
criteria, but annulment becomes irrelevant, because even if annulled the award 
may still be enforced in other jurisdictions beside the country of the seat. 
Annulment is relevant only for the country of the sat, within its territory. In 
practical terms, the ultimate power of recognition and enforcement is where there 
are assets to respond for the decision. By adopting the language ‘may’ and not 
‘must’ refuse, the New York Convention actually supports this pers ctive. If 
granting full power of recognition and enforcement to the Courts of the seat 
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would have been a purpose, it would have imposed mandatory refusal to 
enforcement courts when the award had been set aside at the seat of the 
arbitration. Instead, it brought recognition and enforcement to where it matters 
most.88 Notwithstanding, the majority of the enforcement courts still show 
deference to the annulment decision and tend to decline enforcement of such 
award.89 
 
Recognition and enforcement of the award can still be refused based on two other 
grounds, as foreseen in article V(2). However, unlike the grounds reviewed so 
far, refusal may be granted in such circumstances by the court’s own motion and 
without any request from the party resisting recognitio  and enforcement. 
 
Exceptions set forth in said provision work as a ‘sfety-valve’ and serve the 
purpose of allowing the Convention contracting states to protect their own public 
interests.90  
 
The first of this second set of grounds is the non-arbitrability of the dispute – 
article V(2)(a). Whenever the court considers that the issues dealt with in the 
award could not have been submitted to arbitration, because they are not at the 
free disposal of the parties, it may refuse to recognise and enforce it.  
 
Thoroughly debated in academia, the arbitrability issue has evolved in the last 
years. Many national legal statutes have broadened th  range of subject-matters 
that parties may refer to an arbitral tribunal using their autonomy.91 For instance, 
the recent Portuguese Arbitration Act, inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law 
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and in line with the most modern statutes and arbitral institutions, has widened the 
concept of arbitrability,92 by making it grow from ‘any dispute that does not 
concern non-disposable rights’93 to ‘any dispute regarding claims of property 
nature’ or even ‘regarding non-pecuniary claims, provided that the parties to the 
dispute are entitled to conclude a settlement regarding the subject matter of the 
dispute’94. In what regards international arbitration, the N w Arbitration Act 
adopts a clear favor validitatis approach considering that the arbitration agreement 
shall be valid (thus the dispute deemed arbitrable) if it complies with the 
respective requirements of the law chosen by the parties to govern the arbitration 
agreement, of the law governing the merits of the dispute or of Portuguese law. 95 
 
In the New York Convention wording, the concept of a difference that is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration is the same used in article II(1) and refers to 
the legal incapability imposed by a given law which restricts arbitrability to a 
certain type of claims or disputes.96 According to article V(2)(a), the court 
assesses the arbitrability of the subject matter dealt with in the award pursuant to 
its own law – the law of the country in which recognition and enforcement are 
sought. Naturally this depends first and foremost on the enforcement State own 
concept of what disputes should be reserved for the courts of law and the ones that 
                                                          
92 Highly influenced by Swiss and German laws, according to A RIBEIRO MENDES, ‘A Nova 
Lei de Arbitragem Voluntária Evolução ou Continuidade?’ pp. 10-11, available at 
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93 Art. 1(1) of the former Portuguese Arbitration Act – Lei 31/86. 
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may be submitted to arbitration,97 but according to that State’s international 
notion of arbitrability.98 
 
Typical non-arbitrable subject matters are usually illustrated by issues concerning 
employment law, competition law, regulatory law and i solvency law, among 
others. Nevertheless, in what concerns insolvency law, it is fairly common to see a 
clear distinction between ‘core’ issues of insolvency, which encompass the 
opening and closing of the insolvency proceedings, appointment of the 
administrator and inventory of claims and assets99, and matters regarding claims 
against or by the insolvent party, verification of credits and severability of assets 
of the insolvent estate, which have been increasingly considered to be capable of 
being subject to arbitration.  
 
However, in many contracting states, the effects of insolvency in the arbitration 
agreement do not fall under the discussion of arbitra ility, in the sense that claims 
remain indisputably arbitrable. Instead, the arbitration agreement may be deemed 
to be null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, for the purpose 
of article II(3). If that is the case, then recognition and enforcement of the award 
would not be refused for non-arbitrability of the subject matter, but, if argued, for 
‘invalidity’ (here used in its broadest sense) of the arbitration agreement under its 
governing law, based on article V(1)(a).100 
 
Finally, the award may be refused recognition/enforcement if the court finds it to 
be contrary to public policy – article V(2)(b). It is one of the most invoked 
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grounds in the attempt to bar recognition and enforcement but it is rarely 
granted.101  
 
The vagueness of the concept is much due to the freedom that States have to 
determine their own public policy and it is consistent with the purpose of 
excluding an award that is deemed to violate the State core sense of justice. 
However, the ambiguity of the notion of public policy may also serve to hinder 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and may be abusively used 
as an emergency escape to circumvent the New York Convention pro-
enforcement approach.102 
 
In light of the provision set forth in article V(2)(b), public policy according to 
which the award’s recognition and enforcement has to be in line with is the one of 
the country where it is sought – the lex fori. Such defence must be construed 
narrowly as it should only be employed ‘where enforcement would violate the 
forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice’103. It has been submitted 
however that a purely national concept of public policy does not fulfil the spirit 
and purpose of the Convention and its favourable treatment of foreign awards. 
The approach that is reputed to be the most compatible with such purpose is the 
one that adopts an international and not a domestic dimension, a national 
standard specifically for international awards whic is more generous than for 
domestic awards.104 
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In some countries, a few principles and provisions f insolvency law are deemed 
to be part of the State national and international public policy. Hence, when 
insolvency of one of the parties to the arbitration s declared, such notion may 
obstruct to the recognition and enforcement of the award based on public policy 
ground, if sought before the courts of those countries. 
 
In France, for instance, principle of the preclusion of individual actions, 
provisions on the dispossession of the debtor, interruption of proceedings and 
principle of equality among creditors are considered to form part of the French 
ordre public. Therefore, as a principle, a foreign arbitral award rendered against 
an insolvent party should only have the chance to be recognised and enforced 
before a French court if it is confined to determine the amount of the credit and 
declare it against the estate pursuant to the applicable provisions of insolvency 
law.105 In 2009, the Cour de Cassation confirmed this route when refusing to 
enforce an award based on its violation of French iternational public policy. The 
Cour de Cassation found that the arbitral tribunal had violated public policy by 
ordering an insolvent party to pay damages, instead of limiting itself to validate 
and quantify those damages. Pursuant to French insolvency law, and as a matter 
of public policy, legal proceedings (including arbit ation) should be limited to the 
validation and the quantification of claims, resuming only upon the stay of such 
proceedings and the filing of the respective claim with the Administrator.106 
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Yet, ‘the German Supreme Court was less stringent and accepted a condemnatory 
award as proof of claim in insolvency proceedings. It held that the award was to 
be interpreted as merely determining the existence of the claim and its amount for 
the purposes of insolvency proceedings. However, it should be emphasised that 
the creditor did file its claim in the insolvency procedure and that it was clear to 
all the parties that the award was to be used for the purposes of insolvency 
proceedings’.107 Therefore, also according to German courts practice, an 
insolvency creditor may only ask the arbitral tribunal to declare its claim valid, 
since an arbitral award ordering the Administrator  fulfil an insolvency 
creditor’s claim would not be enforceable under German law.108 
 
In this connection, as discussed above, arbitrators may be compelled to take 
insolvency domestic regulatory and public order requirements into account in 
their decision. 
 
IV.  The Portuguese Insolvency law solution 
 
Under Portuguese law, the intersection between insolvency and arbitration is dealt 
with in article 87 of the Portuguese Insolvency and Recuperation of Companies 
Code (PIC), enacted in 2004. This is an innovative provision which was missing 
in the former Bankruptcy Code.109 
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Article 87 PIC was inspired by the former wording of article 52110 of the Spanish 
Insolvency Law (Ley Concursal).111 In fact, the wording of this provision in the 
Code’s Preliminary Draft was a mere translation of said article 52(1), declaring 
the suspension of the efficacy of the arbitration agreements to which the insolvent 
is a party, without prejudice to the applicable international treaties.112 However, 
the final wording of said article 87 actually became ore sophisticated,113 as 
follows:114  
                                                          
110  Artículo 52. Procedimientos arbitrales. 1. Los conve ios arbitrales en que sea parte el deudor 
quedarán sin valor ni efecto durante la tramitación del concurso, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto 
en los tratados internacionales. 2. Los procedimientos arbitrales en tramitación al momento de 
la declaración del concurso se continuarán hasta la firmeza del laudo. See Ley 22/2003, de 10 
de julio, Concursal, Boletín Oficial del Estado, 10 julio 2003, available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2003/07/10/pdfs/A26905-26965.pdf.  
The wording of article 52(1) has been amended by Ley 11/2011 and currently states that the 
declaration of insolvency by itself has no effect on the mediation and arbitration agreements to 
which the insolvent is a party, unless the court deems them detrimental to the insolvency 
proceedings in which case the former may be suspended, but always without prejudice to the 
provisions of applicable international treaties. See Boletín Oficial del Estado, 21 mayo 2011, 
available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/05/21/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-8847.pdf. 
111 L MENEZES LEITÃO, in Código da Insolvência e da Recuperação de Empresas Anotado, 
Almedina, Coimbra, 2009, p. 128ff. 
112 As per art. 80 of Anteprojecto do Código, in Código da Insolvência e da Recuperação de 
Empresas, Ministério da Justiça, Coimbra Editora, 2004. 
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Empresas Anotado, Quid Juris, Lisboa, 2009, p. 360. 
114 Under the caption Convenções Arbitrais (Arbitration Agreements), the original text reads as 
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disposto em tratados internacionais aplicáveis. 
2. Os processos pendentes à data da declaração de insolvência prosseguirão porém os seus 






1. Without prejudice to the applicable international treaties, the efficacy of 
arbitration agreements to which the insolvent is party, relating to 
disputes which result may affect the value of the insolvency estate, shall 
be suspended. 
2. Proceedings pending as of the date of the declaration of insolvency shall 
continue, without prejudice to the provisions set for h in article 85(3) and 
of article 128(3), where applicable. 
 
First of all, it must be underlined that article 87(1) makes an explicit reservation in 
favour of international treaties. 
 
Although there is still no Portuguese case law on the scope of said provision, 
considering that it follows the path laid down by Spanish law, it is worth to note 
that, in 2009, the Court of Appeal of Barcelona, deci ing a matter under the 
former wording of Ley Concursal, found that, due to the explicit reservation in 
favour of international treaties, such legal provision should be construed as 
excluding international arbitration.115 
 
It is possible to have the same interpretation in face of the Portuguese provision, 
as it also excludes international treaties application. Following to such reasoning, 
this legal provision would only apply to domestic arbitration. Cases where an 
international arbitration award is under discussion would be dealt with under the 
New York Convention, of which Portugal is a signatory State. 
 
According to this understanding, a creditor of the insolvency relying the proof of 
its credit (duly claimed in the insolvency proceedings) on an international arbitral 
                                                          





award, would necessarily have its credit recognized an  enforced within the 
insolvency proceedings, namely for purposes of verificat on and respective 
payment. Meaning that the insolvency court would grant the exequatur, but would 
be prevented from reviewing the merits of the arbitral decision and would 
automatically, i.e., without further discussion of the grounds invoked, admit the 
claimed credit to the verified list of creditors, in which it would be ranked, and 
afterwards proceed to payment, according to creditors’ precedence rules provided 
by the national insolvency law. 
 
This would undoubtedly be the friendliest construction of the Portuguese legal 
provision towards international arbitration, as this would mean that foreign 
awards would be insolvency-proof in what regards Portuguese debtors. 
 
However, one of the fundamental features of insolvency proceedings is that every 
credit claimed against the insolvent must be open to dispute by any other creditor. 
This obviously brings accrued difficulties when a cl im emerges from a dispute 
which the parties to the relevant agreement have referred to arbitration, since 
other creditors of the insolvency are not bound by the arbitral agreement entered 
into between such parties. 
 
Thus, a further interpretation of article 87 is required to identify its precise scope 
of application. 
 
Despite the general caption of ‘Arbitration Agreements’, article 87(1) refers to the 
efficacy of the arbitration agreement, whereas article 87(2) refers to pending 
arbitration proceedings. This distinction leads us to conclude that §2 limits the 
scope of §1. Indeed, in what regards arbitration proceedings already in course, 
article 87(2) confirms the efficacy of the arbitration agreement, in which the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is grounded, espite the declaration of 




effects that insolvency has in such pending proceedings by validating its 
continuance, but pointing out the replacement of the insolvent for the 
Administrator in the arbitration116 and the filing of the creditor’s claim within the 
insolvency proceedings117. 
 
Thus, under article 87(2), the insolvency of a Portuguese party to an arbitration 
does not have any other impact on the pending arbitr tion proceedings except for 
the participation of the insolvency administrator in the arbitration from then on, as 
its representative, and the imposition to the creditor to file its claim in the 
insolvency proceedings as the only mean to achieve payment.  
 
Naturally that, resuming here the discussion on the requirements of due process, 
although not imposed by law, a stay of the arbitration seems to be advisable, so 
that the insolvency administrator may become familiar with the subject matter 
under discussion and duly proceed with the representatio  of the insolvent or 
reach a settlement with the creditor. 
 
Following the line of reasoning that has been argued, also under Portuguese law, 
insolvency does not trigger any kind of incapacity to the insolvent, causes no form 
of invalidity to the arbitration agreement and has no impact on the jurisdiction of 
the arbitral tribunal. 
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On the other hand, when no arbitration has yet been lau ched, the impact of 
insolvency occurs on the arbitration agreement to which the insolvent is a party – 
article 87(1). 
 
However, article 87(1) does not generally apply to every single arbitration 
agreement. In fact, the wording of said provision limits its scope to disputes which 
result may influence the value of the insolvent estat . Thus, in order to properly 
assess the rule’s extent, one has to identify which d sputes may potentially have a 
result capable of affecting such value. 
 
Article 46(1) PIC defines insolvent estate by saying that it is intended to satisfy 
the insolvency creditors, upon payment of its own debts, and that, save for 
otherwise provided, it encompasses all of the debtor’s patrimony as of the date of 
the insolvency declaration, as well as all the assets and rights acquired by the 
debtor while the proceedings are pending.  
 
Therefore, only the disputes referred to arbitration which outcome may potentially 
affect the assets or rights included in the insolvent patrimony shall be affected by 
the impact of the insolvency declaration.118 The disputes envisaged by the rule are 
exclusively the ones that address specific assets or rights (e.g. receivables) 
encompassed in the insolvent estate. 
 
As a consequence, a potential right of credit over th  insolvency does not form 
part of the insolvent estate. In case it is recognized, it conveys an asset of a third 
party over the insolvent estate, which corresponds to a liability of the insolvency 
estate. Yet such liability has no effect on the value of said estate, since said value 
corresponds to the sum of the rights and assets therein. Naturally, the estate shall 
eventually provide for payment of the acknowledged credits, but indeed the 
                                                          




amount of the credits claimed and recognized is absolutely independent of its 
value.  As a result, pursuant to article 87(1), a claim where recognition and 
quantification of a credit is sought is not prevented from being submitted to 
arbitration, as the arbitration agreement to which both creditor and debtor are 
parties remain valid and effective.119  
 
This means that Portuguese insolvency law acknowledges the validity and 
efficacy of an arbitration agreement entered into by the insolvent party 
irrespective of the insolvency declaration. Consequently, an arbitral decision 
settling a dispute with no influence on the value of the insolvent estate should be 
recognized within the insolvency proceedings.  
 
Therefore, a foreign award recognizing the existence of and quantifying a credit 
over the insolvency estate ought to be recognized and enforced by the insolvency 
court. That is to say that, pursuant to article 87(1) and the aforementioned 
provisions of the New York Convention, the relevant credit must be admitted to 
the list of creditors and deemed to be automatically verified without further 
discussion on the merits. 
 
However, this automatic recognition of a credit based on an international 
arbitration award must still be in line with the principle of equality of unsecured 
creditors and with the concept of collective enforcement of credits of the 
insolvency proceedings. These are indeed core values of insolvency which may 
inclusively be deemed to be part of public policy, according to the understanding 
of French and German courts already mentioned above. 
 
                                                          





This means that in order to receive payment, all creditors – including the ones that 
are party to an arbitration agreement and therefore are entitled to submit the 
dispute to an international arbitral tribunal – must claim their credits in the 
insolvency proceedings, which is the only source of payment. Insolvency 
proceedings are thus conceived as a magnet centre where every single creditor 
must come to be paid, the aim being to eliminate any chance of enforcement of 
credits outside such proceedings.   
 
This solution puts Portuguese insolvency law in line with the principle of 
preclusion of individual actions as it is adopted by the majority of legislations. 
Any claim by an unsecured bankruptcy creditor for payment against the estate 
may only be pursued by filing in bankruptcy. (…) The purpose is to prevent the 
depletion of the debtor’s assets and to ensure orderly payment to creditors. All 
ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors are paid pro rata, in accordance 
with the principle of the equal treatment of creditors – par conditio creditorum or 
paritas creditorum.120 
 
On the other hand, in light of the distinction set for h in said provision, should a 
claim pertaining to a specific asset or right held by the insolvent be prevented 
from being submitted to an arbitral tribunal, pursuant to the arbitration agreement 
entered into between the parties? In view of the legal definition set forth in article 
46 PIC, it seems unquestionable that the result of such dispute would influence the 
value of the insolvent estate. Apparently, as per article 87(2), already pending 
arbitrations do not raise this problem, irrespective of the influence they might 
have on the value of the estate, which can be regard d as an incongruence of the 
regime. 
 
                                                          




Under Portuguese insolvency law, anyone who claims to have a proprietary right 
over an asset that has been wrongfully seized by the Administrator and included 
in the insolvent estate may file its claim within the insolvency proceedings, 
pursuant to the special procedure of restitution and separation of property, 
foreseen in articles 141 to 145 PIC. This is deemed to be the only way of reaction 
available to the owner, in face of an abusive apprehension of an asset that did not 
belong to the insolvent. It follows a procedural path very similar to the one 
established for the claim and verification of credits, with few differences, but also 
providing for a trial upon the submissions of the parties and a final judgement 
deciding on the property issue. However, the legal regime also allows for the 
judge to simply order the separation of the asset under discussion, at the request of 
the insolvency administrator, supported by a favourable opinion of the creditors 
committee if appointed.121  
 
In view of the above, if the efficacy of the arbitration agreements relating to 
disputes which may affect the value of the insolvency estate, to which the 
insolvent is a party, is suspended upon declaration of i solvency, article 87(1) PIC 
would prevent any creditor, claiming a proprietary ight over the assets 
encompassed in the estate, to resort to arbitration to settle the dispute. In fact, the 
suspension of the efficacy of the arbitration agreem nt entails that none of the 
parties may invoke it to commence arbitration against the other. The arbitration 
agreement is deemed to be temporarily ineffective (ex lege). As a consequence, 
upon declaration of insolvency of one of the parties o the arbitration agreement, 
no arbitration could be launched to settle a dispute regarding a right or an asset 
comprised in the insolvent estate.  
 
Nevertheless, as discussed previously, the validity of the arbitration agreement 
can only be affected by its governing law and not by he lex concursus. Thus such 
                                                          




effect would only verify if Portuguese law was the ruling one. Moreover, taking 
into consideration the explicit reservation provided in article 87(1) regarding the 
provisions set forth in the applicable international treaties and the favor arbitratis 
spirit purported in the New York Convention, it is conceivable that such limitation 
should not hinder an international arbitration agreem nt efficacy and the scope of 
the rule might be only limited to domestic arbitration agreements. In fact, the 
phrase without prejudice to the applicable international treaties refers to the 
deference national law pays to the primacy of international rule of law, as 
provided for in article 8 of the Portuguese Constitution. 
 
As a consequence, an award rendered in an international arbitration, commenced 
after the insolvency order, settling a dispute pertaining to an asset or right 
included in the insolvent estate – and therefore aff cting its value – could also be 
recognized and enforced by the insolvency court within the insolvency 
proceedings, under the New York Convention which directly rules the case, 
unless some of the exceptions of article V applied. The creditor’s claim based on 
such award would thus be admitted in the insolvency proceedings without further 
discussion on the merits, including when the award refers to a proprietary right of 
the claimant on an asset of the estate, in which case the award would be 
recognized and enforced for the purposes of the restitution and separation of 
property mechanism provided in articles 141 to 145 PIC. Actually, article 87(2) 
does not halt an arbitration already pending at the date of insolvency though 
pertaining to such a claim and it seems that there is no reason to discriminate 
between the two awards.  
 
This construction seems to actually comply with thespirit of the New York 
Convention vis-à-vis the applicable provisions of Portuguese law and better meets 
the terms of an international arbitration, which does not emerge from a foreign 





However, as in any proprietary matter, such decision w uld affect third parties, 
outsiders to the arbitration agreement, notably other creditors of the insolvent, 
who could be overcome in the overall ranking.  
 
In fact, due to the nature and purpose of arbitration itself, international arbitrators 
may not be granted with powers to directly affect persons who are not parties to 
the arbitration agreement.122 However, this is a matter that may be raised when t  
arbitral tribunal is called upon to assess proprieta y issues, for instance. This 
brings into discussion the important and yet unsettled problem of erga omnes 
effects in international arbitration. An international award deciding on a specific 
asset or right held by the insolvent would have an impact on other creditors, on 
the ranking and on the value of the estate, thus affecting or pre-empting the 
insolvency regime. In such context, international arbitration would affect third 
parties and, in that sense, would have erga omnes effect in insolvency ranking and 
distribution. That poses difficult problems, as it is not absolutely established that 
an international arbitration award may be granted with such effect, especially 
within an insolvency proceeding.123 
 
Related to this topic, it has also been discussed whether a foreign arbitration 
award should only have a declaratory effect regarding the insolvent party – 
acknowledging and quantifying the credit or recognizing a proprietary right of the 
claimant or even denying the existence of a credit of the insolvent estate against 
an alleged debtor – or if it may go beyond that andctually condemn the insolvent 
to respectively pay the debt, restitute the asset or restrain from seeking payment of 
a credit. 
 
                                                          
122 BLACKABY/PARTASIDES/REDFERN/HUNTER, op. cit., p. 368. 




An award actually condemning the insolvent party to act according to the 
tribunal’s findings may be deemed to infringe the abovementioned fundamental 
values of insolvency law and therefore in breach of international public policy of 
the state where proceedings were opened.124 Such construction enhances a rather 
formal perspective of violation of public policy. Provided that the claimant files 
its claim and seeks remedy within the insolvency proceedings and that rules 
governing precedence of creditors are observed, although relying on an award 
with such extensive ruling, no material breach of such core values seem  to occur 
and hence there seems to be no reason to consider that a public policy 
infringement verifies. Thus an international arbitral award ordering payment, for 
instance, should be generally accepted provided that the principle of equality of 
creditors is respected – meaning that creditor willnot be paid elsewhere nor 
before other creditors whose claims are ranked higher in the insolvency 
proceedings. 
 
However, an award where the arbitral tribunal provides for a set-off and netting of 
mutual credits of the parties is actually granting a (at least, partial) payment to the 
creditor of the insolvency. And payment outside theinsolvency proceedings 
should be considered contempt for the principles of equality and of preclusion of 
individual actions, as well as for domestic insolvency set-off rules, which are 
known to be particularly tight. Besides, it also affects other creditors and, as 
mentioned, it remains unclear in how far international arbitrators may decide with 
such range.125 
 
Notwithstanding, regard for international rule of law, particularly in the case at 
hand, for the New York Convention, leads to conclude that such award could even 
so be acknowledged, unless public interests would be at stake. In light of the 
                                                          
124 In this vein, the decisions held by French and German courts referred above. 




notion of Portuguese international public policy, the declaration of a credit’s 
extinction can hardly be considered to infringe the set of fundamental principles 
that structure the presence of the Country in the concert of nations.126 Such 
decision does not in its essence seem to violate the essential notions of morality 
and justice as they are envisioned and upheld in Portuguese legal order.127 
 
In this sense, international arbitrators may actually have the chance to grant an 
advantage to a creditor of the insolvency estate, backed-up by an award which, 
under the New York Convention, must be recognized and enforced without being 
submitted to further challenge of other creditors and without revision on the 
merits of the cause.  
 
                                                          
126 In decision held by the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice on June 2, 2006, available at 
http://www.dgsi.pt/jstj.nsf/954f0ce6ad9dd8b980256b5f003fa814/c70f89b50d8a287c8025712a
00305768?OpenDocument 
127 Some queries in this respect may however arise when, for instance, considering a credit for 
punitive damages (BORRIS/HENNECKE, op.cit., p. 325), traditionally deemed to be 
unacceptable in light of Portuguese law, but already purported by some authors (cf. P MEIRA 








Insolvency law and international arbitration have fundamental differences in 
nature and purposes. Thus when coming across in a particular situation, they may 
be tempted to ignore each other. However, it is generally accepted that 
insolvency, eminently territorial and regulatory, should be deemed to have a very 
limited impact on international arbitration. Notably it is accepted to have no 
influence on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. In turn, an international 
award, making part of a transnational legal order and being backed up by the New 
York Convention, should be automatically recognized and enforced by the 
insolvency court, unless some of the few exceptions f reseen therein apply.  
 
Although in a rather ambiguous wording, it seems to result from Portuguese 
insolvency law provisions that the declaration of insolvency of one of the parties 
to an arbitration agreement does not prevent arbitrtion proceedings from 
commencing nor continuing. Such declaration does not affect the insolvent’s 
capacity to be a party to the arbitration. The validity and efficacy of an 
international arbitration agreement remains intact according to its own governing 
law and so is the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.  
 
Thus, from a Portuguese perspective, it seems possible to argue that when an 
international arbitration award is to be submitted o insolvency proceedings there 
is, as a rule, no reason for refusal of recognition and enforcement, save for 
situations where the limited exceptions provided for in the New York Convention 
apply, but which, as discussed, do not seem to be directly triggered in any aspect 
by the insolvency order.  
 
Such a construction is thought to be in line with the essential values of 
international arbitration which, emerging from a trnsnational order, should not 




source of legitimacy, international arbitration may be deemed to occasionally 
prevail over domestic insolvency provisions. However, domestic judges may bar 
such result in particular cases where international pub ic policy values are deemed 
to be in risk of infringement or where arbitrability and jurisdiction issues arise. 
Hence, the ultimate impact of an award in insolvency proceedings is reserved to 
be unfolded by the insolvency courts – yet bound by the spirit and purpose of the 
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